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MS. COUNTRYMAN: Hi. We're going to do an on-the-record briefing 
at this time by Ambassador Zoellick, USTR. And he's going to preview 
for you tomorrow's U.S.-EU Summit, and then take your questions. 
Thanks. 
MR. ZOELLICK: Thank you, Mary Ellen. Well, as you all 
undoubtedly are aware, today's primary focus was on NATO and the 
exchange on transatlantic security issues. Tomorrow we turn to a 
different Euro-Atlantic relationship, that of the U.S. ties with an 
evolving European Union. 
This is the 21st U.S.-EU Summit. This was a process that was 
launched in 1991, with something called the Transatlantic Declaration, 
which was an early post-Cold War effort to adjust institutional ties 
to a new Europe. And just so you have a sense of the logic of that 
declaration, at the time the European Union was then called European 
Community, the EC, as opposed to EU. And it was clear that it was 
developing particular institutions of a European-wide nature. And so 
the prior Bush administration thought it was useful to develop 
additional special ties with the institutions with that new Europe, at 
the same time that it would maintain its ties with the nation states 
or in this context, called the member states. 
And let me give you a word of explanation about the European 
Union, because I understand people have different backgrounds -- some 
of you are from the states here. Most Americans struggle to understand 
exactly what the European Union is. That's okay, because most 
Europeans do, as well. I find that it's helpful to keep in mind the 
notion of a shared sovereignty, because what one has going on in 
Europe today is a question of a mixture of sovereignty at the nation 
state level and the European institution level. And it's an ongoing 
process. 
It started with the whole notion of trying to promote the 
recovery of Europe through economic ties that would also have a 
political dimension. A key cornerstone of this is the Franco-German 
reconciliation. And over the years there have been various treaties 
that have created a set of legal structures and European institutions. 
One of the most significant one being the Treaty of Rome, which is, in 
a sense, the basic Constitution. Another being the single market, 
which created -- was launched in 1992. 
Together this has created a mixed political structure. And the 
reason I'm explaining this is it's going to affect a little bit your 
understanding about what's going on tomorrow. The European Union 
includes something called the European Council, which is an 
intergovernmental body dealing with the member states. And that 
happens at the ministerial level across a series of topics. It also 
happens at the head of government level. 
Then there's the European Commission, which is, obviously, 
headquartered in Brussels and which many Americans associate with the 
European Union. And that, in effect, is the executive branch that 
develops and executes the policies. Then there's the European 
Parliament, which meets both in Brussels and Strasbourg -- this week 
in Strasbourg. And over the course of the '90s, it has been developing 
a stronger role; under something called the Treaty of Amsterdam, it 
was given some co-decisional authority. 
Then there's the European Central Bank, coming out of Maastricht. 
And again, to give you a sense of the period of time -- you're all 
familiar with the Euro, but starting next year, the Euro will be 
transformed to an actual currency, with about 14 billion notes and SO 
billion coins. And then there's the European Court of Justice. 
So the point of this is that you have a model of a political 
structure that's a continuing integration process, and in some ways 
this is a particularly interesting time in Europe because a couple of 
things are happening -- you have the 15 member states dealing with the 
question about 12 new possible members over the next couple years. And 
the institutions of this structure have to evolve because many of them 
were build originally for six members and then 12 members and then 15 
members. 
So, in effect, from a U.S. point of view, you've got a 
constitutional debate going on in Europe. And so, there have been 
speeches in recent months given by Chancellor Schroeder or Foreign 
Minister Fischer of Germany -- that are engaging in this debate about 
the future structure of Europe. And there are questions similar to 
what you would have in the United States about what level of 
government should various functions be performed; although in Europe, 
this is called a question of subsidiarity as opposed to one of 
federalism. 
Another term that you may hear batted around tomorrow is the 
question of competency. And this is the issue of who, within this 
system, has authority for responsibility. Now, the lineage that has 
the longest authority here really dates back to the economic area, and 
particularly from that the trade area, which is the one I obviously 
deal with. And so, my counterpart in this system is Commissioner 
Pascale Lamy however, works with the Council of Trade Ministers for 
his mandate. 
There are other key areas like the Common Agricultural Policy, 
which creates an integrated agriculture policy or competition policy. 
And then in 1993, there was the launch of something called the Common 
Foreign And Security Policy, which was an effort to coordinate foreign 
policy. And then, later in the '90s, there was the European Security 
and Defense Identity, which intersects with the whole NATO discussion 
you went through. 
And I just thought it would be useful for you to be sensitive to 
some of the undercurrents of this process. One is, all of this is 
developing a sense of European identity at the same time people have a 
member state identity. And for many, this identity needs to be defined 
with respect to the United States. That's understandable, because the 
United States is obviously large, influential and important to Europe, 
and so in the debate you hear, sometimes it will be a tone of contrast 
of identity, and sometimes it's a sense of shared identity. There is 
no doubt there is a great number of shared interests and values, but 
there is also sensitivity to European distinctiveness. 
Second, there is a particular sense of pride and importance where 
the European competency is the greatest. For example, in the area that 
I deal with, in trade, because it's been developed over time and 
Europe is, no doubt about it, a very serious player in terms of the 
overall trade scene. Where in some other areas it isn't as well 
developed. 
A third element is figuring out the borders of Europe and this, I 
think, will also be part of the President's discussion, because 
everybody knew what Europe meant before the end of the Cold War, and 
now the question is, where do you enlarge, where do you stop, where do 
you have other relationships, what are your relationships with Russia, 
Ukraine and Turkey. 
And then, fourth, again, is the security issue as highlighted by 
the Balkans, where there is a sharp reminder of the limitations in the 
'90s and the topic that was discussed today. 
Now, I went through this because I wanted to give you some 
backdrop for the Swedish stop. An interesting bilateral piece of this 
is that President Bush will be the first American President in office 
to visit Sweden. But the reason that he's going to Sweden is that as 
part of this structure I mentioned, every six months there is a change 
in what they call the presidency country. And so the past six months 
before that it was France; this six months, it's Sweden; the following 
six months it will be Belgium. 
And that country plays a coordinating role in this inter-
governmental process. And I distinguish this presidency from the 
presidency of the Commission, which is obviously held by Mr. Prodi. 
So starting in 1991, the United States agreed to have a 
presidential-level meeting with the presidency country and the 
president of the Commission, reflecting, in a sense, the changing 
European structure. 
So, tomorrow the President's party will be meeting with the Swedish 
Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Trade Minister, but also the 
presidency of the Commission, Mr. Prodi; the Trade Commissioner, my 
counterpart, Mr. Lamy. And the reason I mentioned on the foreign 
policy is that you also have the Commissioner for External Affairs 
there, who is Chris Patten, who you may know from his time in Hong 
Kong, and another position which was created which is called the 
Secretary General of the Council and the High Representative of the 
Common Foreign Security Policy, and this is a man named Javier Solana, 
who, prior to this post, was the NATO Secretary General. So he had the 
post that Robertson had before. 
So you have it set up for a combination of trade and economics 
and some foreign policy discussion. And then in the evening, the 
President will have a discussion with the heads of the European 
governments. 
Now, some of the topics that I expect will be covered tomorrow 
will, first, on trade and investment you have a certain irony in that 
on the one hand, you have an extraordinarily deep economic 
relationship across the Atlantic. You have two-way investment of about 
$1.1 trillion supporting about 3 million jobs on either side of the 
Atlantic. 
The introduction of the Euro has actually enhanced this 
integration process because it's created a competition across European 
countries on top of the single market, in part because companies could 
no longer fudge on exchange rates. They were forced, as they did their 
benchmarking of costs or their consumer prices, to sort of face the 
competition. And you've seen over the past couple of years a very 
interesting development of European countries sort of restructuring 
along lines of business models -- you might have many in the United 
States -- and then part of their strategy was to acquire companies in 
the United States as part of their global position. 
So you look at the business pages, obviously, this continues 
today with the boom of sort of mergers and acquisitions. So, at one 
level, you have an increasingly deep integration. And this will also 
be reflected tomorrow in a session of something called the 
transatlantic business dialogue, which parallels on this process. 
In my area, I've been having a series of discussions, as recently 
as Monday and I'll have some again tonight with Commissioner Lamy 
about launching the new global trade round, which, as you may know, 
will -- at least the timing for this to occur is in November of this 
year in Doha. And this is what the United States and other countries 
were unable to do in 1999 in Seattle. 
Commissioner Lamy who has been in office now since a little bit 
before Seattle, has been working on this issue pretty much since that 
time. I'm obviously newer to office, but a couple of weeks ago, I came 
to Europe for some meetings around the OECD to try to emphasize the 
President's commitment to trade and launching a new round. And 
together, Commissioner Lamy and I have been trying to push that 
process forward. Last week I was in Shanghai where I was dealing with 
the East Asian counties, again trying to get a sense of sort of 
momentum for this process. 
And, as you probably saw, we also were fortunate, building on my 
predecessor's work, to move forward the process of China's accession 
to the WTO. That will be another sense of positive movement for the 
other countries. And one part that was particularly interesting to see 
was, China was not only interested in getting into the WTO, but they 
want to help this launch of this round. 
So what Commissioner Lamy and I are now doing is having a rather 
sort of in-depth dialogue about U.S. and European interests -- see how 
we can try to reconcile differences enough to move forward the process 
overall. 
Now, the trade world we now live in is one where these things can 
no longer be done by the United States, Europe and Japan or the quad 
countries, adding Canada. It is a critical role for developing 
countries. 
But the other key point that I think both Commissioner Lamy and I 
felt is that if the United States and EU are not trying to work 
together on this, the odds of a successful launch would be very small. 
If we are successful in doing it, it enhances the odds, doesn't make 
it certain, and so, frankly, after the effort we had in the Western 
Hemisphere with the FTAA, I've tried to focus much of my time on this 
effort working with him. 
In addition, we obviously have a bilateral relationship, and we 
have a series of disputes, as you would expect in part because of the 
deepening of the economic relationship. And there is something that's 
interesting going on here that I saw, having come back after eight 
years, and that is because the economies are actually becoming more 
deeply integrated, issues that used to be considered more in the area 
of domestic regulation now are affected the international economic 
environment. So topics like health and safety or genetically-enhanced 
materials, or privacy, or tax issues. And so it changes the nature of 
the challenge of how we sort of manage these issues. 
As probably all of you know, Commissioner Lamy and I were 
fortunate to try to resolve this bananas problem that had been kicking 
around for nine years. That set a useful tone, frankly. Right before I 
went to China, we were able to resolve another one dealing with sort 
of wheat and corn gluten. 
And while each of these may seem sort of small in their sector, 
they end up affecting the overall tone. Another idea that you may hear 
about tomorrow is to explore whether we can draw on some experience of 
dispute resolution in other contexts, particularly a median process, 
still consistent with the WTO. 
And, again, just to give you a sense of some of the technical 
work that goes on, we also hope to be able to move forward with a 
mutual recognition agreement in a particular sector -- in this case, 
it's marine safety equipment, where what will be interesting is the 
precedent of having the EU and the United States determine that if the 
other side meets its own safety standards, that will be acceptable in 
the other country -- or, in this case, the European Union. So while 
it's obviously just one sector, it's something that we hope we might 
be able to build on. 
And then, fitting the larger sort of theme of this visit about 
the overall U.S. relationship with Europe, we also have trade issues 
related to the central and eastern European enlargement. You'll 
probably hear a little bit more about that on the Poland stop. 
Because the relationship is more than economic, and also foreign 
policy, there will be discussion about southeastern Europe. Obviously, 
some of that took place in the NATO context, but there is an economic 
and foreign policy component, there is something called the stability 
pact that has been developed by the Europeans and the United States to 
create an economic basis for support. And we've also worked on trying 
to open and improve the economic and trade and investment environment. 
Another topic will be the enlargement of the EU, just as the 
President spoke about the enlargement of NATO. At the dinner, I expect 
that this will be more of a strategic conversation about the overall 
context of the change in Europe, including relations with Russia, 
Ukraine and the South Caucasus. 
And then there is the non-European aspects of regional foreign 
policy. And this is something, again, that was sort of launched about 
10 years ago, so there will be certainly some discussion of the 
Mideast and, obviously, it's good news, the cease-fire that the 
President talked about. There will be discussion about North Korea and 
interests there from dealing with inter-Korean cooperation, 
nonproliferation, human rights issues, the U.S. recent proposal for 
discussion on a broad agenda. 
And then there will be the transnational agenda, and that will 
include, obviously, global climate change, also HIV/AIDS, which is an 
issue that involves everything from financial support to health 
prevention activities to, in my area, the whole question of 
intellectual property and how one deals with inteltectual property in 
a pandemic -- something that Commissioner Lamy and I worked on. 
So, in summary, backing from this, just as the U.S. relationship 
with NATO is an important institution relationship, so the U.S. 
relationship with an evolving EEU is important. And as you undoubtedly 
know, Sweden is not a member of NATO, but it is now the presidency of 
the EU. So while you have some overlap, it's not total. 
There is no doubt that there are differences, as there have been, 
in this relationship in the past, but I think my sense is, is that one 
thing that will come out of this and was clear from the President's 
press conference, was an overall U.S. commitment to working with 
friends and allies in Europe. 
I think, having been through these meetings at other times, 
another important element would simply be a chance for these 
individuals to get to know each other at a personal level. And so, I 
think basically, there will be a lot of focusing on the one hand, the 
U.S. doing some listening, explaining U.S. views, having a discussion, 
and laying the groundwork for four, and I hope eight years of 
relationship with Europe. And, as you probably know, the President 
will be back in Italy, in Genoa in July for the G-7/G-8 Summit. So 
that's the context, and I would be happy to try to take your 
questions. 
Q What we saw in Quebec appeared to indicate that the forces 
that turned out in Seattle opposed to this WTO round have not 
dissipated, but remain galvanized somewhat. Can you tell us from your 
standpoint what has changed in how you're planning to accommodate or 
confront those views, such that you might be able to get started now 
what the previous administration wasn't able to get started in 
Seattle? 
MR. ZOELLICK: Yes. Well, first off, in a way, I think Quebec 
City showed that demonstrators are, and have been for many decades, a 
fact of life. That doesn't necessarily mean that they need to disrupt 
the discussions, or necessarily prevent the process from moving 
forward. 
Obviously, we were very pleased in Quebec City to launch the FTAA 
process and have a schedule and deadlines. And I, personally, believe 
that the problem in Seattle was less the demonstrators and more some 
of the challenges that the key countries had in terms of trying to 
come together on a launch. 
It's one of the reasons why Commissioner Lamy and I are trying to 
work closely on this, one of the reasons that I was in Asia, one of 
the reasons why the Chinese role, I think, can be important, and the 
reason that Commissioner Lamy and I are keenly interested in trying to 
reach out to key countries in the developing world, like South Africa 
and others, that can play a role in this process. Mexico is another 
one. 
So the -- at one level, you have to separate the hard work of 
sort of putting the agenda together, recognizing that the objective is 
to launch the negotiation, not to complete the negotiation. This was 
obviously last done at Punta del Este in 1986 for the Uruguay Round, 
which took a number of years to complete. And then, when it comes time 
to the demonstrators more generally, I think they at least have become 
a symbol of a series of concerns. 
Now, one of the challenges is obviously -- is that moving for the 
trade system at a time of economic slowdown. The point the President 
has made and that I have resonated is, in many ways, there is no more 
important time to be able to keep the liberalization process going 
forward. 
And then there are things that I think are important in terms of 
trying to deal with specific concerns. For example, the transparency 
and openness of the process. The Canadians, for example, in Quebec 
created a special discussion, bringing in a number of NGO groups. 
In the case of the United States, we've tried to open up some of 
our process by instituting a series of environmental reviews, not only 
for the FTAA but for starting for the round process. So there's 
clearly a lesson about different constituencies about bringing them 
into the process and having a dialogue. And then, frankly, I think 
it's going to be a responsibility for all of us to try to make the 
case on the benefits of openness and trade. 
And again, just to give you sort of one summary is, is that if 
you take the economic benefits for a family of four from the Uruguay 
Round and NAFTA together, and this is the combination of the growth, 
but also the lower tariffs, it amounts to about $1,300 to $2,000 a 
year for a family of four in the United States, and that's a 
conservative estimate. That is very, very significant, but most people 
don't have a sense of it, so we have to do a better job of explaining 
it. 
On the other hand, there has also been some research by the World 
Bank that pointed out that over the course of the past 20 years, 
developing countries that have had open systems have grown on average 
by about five percent; those that weren't open fell by about one 
percent, and interestingly enough, for the growing countries, you saw 
the income gains all across the income distribution and a decrease in 
the absolute poverty levels. 
And so, frankly, if one is concerned about developing countries, 
both history and recent studies would suggest an open system is going 
to be the formula for them. So I think you have to work on this on 
different levels, at the level of sort of the technical trade 
diplomacy, but also the communications process, and it's one reason 
why, as you can tell, President Bush has emphasized the importance of 
trade as part of his growth agenda along with taxes and energy and 
education. 
Q Ambassador Zoellick, to what extent do you expect the issue 
of global warming to feature in the discussions tomorrow during the 
day or during the dinner? And do you expect the President to take a 
lot of criticism from his counterparts --
Q Question? 
MR. ZOELLICK: The question was, to what extent do I believe that 
global climate change will be part of the discussion, and to what 
degree would the President expect to be criticized. Is that -- we'll 
find out tomorrow, and I think I'm supposed to give you a background 
at the end of that process. 
But having done this for a number of years, I would be -- I think 
that the likelihood of criticism is, frankly, not high. I think the 
likelihood of discussion, you know, is very high, because that's one 
of the reasons that the President is here to talk about these topics. 
And let me just step back on that a little bit, because I had a 
little bit of experience in this in that I ran the process for the 
United States in the Rio summit in '92. 
You know, part of what the United States has been trying, I 
think, to communicate is that, on the one hand, there is a serious 
recognition about the importance of this problem. On the other hand, 
Kyoto was not going to be a successful way of dealing with this. And 
having been dealt with this issue in the past, I frankly have 
maintained a lot of ties with the environmental community, and even 
during the course of the campaign, many people came to me and said 
they were actually worried that Kyoto was going to stymie some 
developments that might actually occur. 
Now, why is that so? I think part of the challenge is to 
recognize that how does one link some of the research and science and 
analysis and changes in technology with a policy regime? And, frankly, 
what was lacking in the Kyoto process was a link between the time 
frame and the specific, the timetables and the targets, and a 
connection with recognizing uncertainty and the nature of an insurance 
policy, what was supposed to be achieved. 
Now, you know, as others have said, you have a fundamental 
problem as well if you don't have key greenhouse gas producers as part 
of the process. That wasn't going to work. We also had had a problem 
in that a 95-0 vote in the Senate is also an indicator that there is 
rather broad based concern about this. 
And you can look at different studies traveling a lot around 
the world, I have to tell you, the place that I think we get a most 
intense sense of this is in Europe I don't hear about it elsewhere. 
And in Europe you get different views about their ability to be able 
to meet those targets and timetables. There was an official study done 
in the year 2000 that raised serious questions. There is a more 
recent, separate consultants study in 2001 that suggests that they 
might. 
But the reality is for the nature of these problems, no one 
country or group of countries is going to be able to handle it. And I 
just think, as a practical matter, the Kyoto regime was not going to 
be successful. And what the United States and the President is doing 
on this trip is communicating his interest, his knowledge, the 
commitment of his administration, offering a hand to say, here are 
ways we can engage on the topic. And, frankly, it will depend somewhat 
on Europeans' own sense of their policy preferences, their political 
constraints. 
And I believe that for all the to-ing and fro-ing, this is a 
critical aspect of re-starting the dialogue, because Kyoto wasn't 
going to go anywhere in the United States or many other countries. 
So I'm actually somewhat optimistic about this, knowing how 
diplomatic processes work. It will go through a phase, and the United 
States needs to be sensitive about some of the aspects of this in the 
European political scene. But, really, there is no alternative than 
countries trying to work together on this, because no one country can 
do it by itself. 
Q I'm from Cleveland, so you can probably anticipate what I'm 
going to ask you about, and that is the situation with LTV Steel 
Corporation on the ropes, a lot of jobs at stake, not only in 
Cleveland, other communities -- 100,000 retirees and their benefits. 
In talking to some of the representatives of the European steel 
community, they say it's not imports, it's the over capacity situation 
in the U.S., it requires a major investment from the government or a 
painful restructuring process, which they don't believe this Section 
201 investigation will lead to, or some of the other initiatives 
you've started. 
So my questions are, can LTV be saved? What will take? Is the 
government willing to put some substantial money into saving it and 
some substantial money into saving it and some of the other steel 
companies that are in bankruptcy? Is the European Commission 
threatening some trade retaliation for the Section 201, such as, say, 
nuisance complaints at WTO or some other -- well, they wouldn't call 
it that -- but some other -- you know, not dealing with things in the 
way that you've been dealing with them in the past? 
MR. ZOELLICK: I'm a little jet lagged here, so if I miss pieces, 
let me know and I'll come back. On the individual companies, I'm not 
really in a position to say. But let me explain then the policy 
context. First off -- and this has been a little bit, I think, 
misunderstood -- just to make sure everybody understands what a 
Section 201 investigation amounts to, this is a provision of U.S. law 
that is within the WTO rules, so this is acceptable under the 
international trading system. It doesn't require findings of unfair 
actions, as antidumping and countervailing duty cases does. Instead, 
it requires -- it has standards that the International Trade 
Commission will examine in terms of whether imports are a substantial 
cause or cause of a substantial injury, recognizing there could be 
other factors. And that is the process that the ITC will review, in 
accordance with U.S. statute that is in accordance with the WTO rules. 
Now, simultaneously, we have talked with countries around the 
world about having negotiations to deal with what we think is the 
underlying problem, which is one of overcapacity in a decentralized 
industry. And when I was in Asia, I talked about this with the 
Japanese, the Koreans. I've talked about it with Commissioner Lamy, 
and this in part reflects, frankly, a rather special history of the 
steel industry. 
If you look at European reconstruction, there was the concept of 
commanding heights industries that many socialist governments thought 
were part of their strategy. And so the steel industry in this country 
-- or in Europe in general, as well as in, frankly, many Asian 
countries, were part of a larger development strategy. So the market 
itself has been skewed for decades and that's reflected in different 
ways. 
Just to distinguish something, there is -- Commissioner Lamy, to 
the best of my knowledge -- which I think is pretty good on this --
has complained about the action. He has not -- he recognizes that a 
201 is within WTO rules and I do not believe that he has said that 
they are going to take any WTO action as long as we obey the rules. 
He's not happy with it, but that's an important distinction. 
There's a separate effort that deals with some past antidumping 
cases that deal with privatization of European companies, where the 
United States had antidumping findings. And he has talked with 
Secretary Evans in the Commerce Department about the need to resolve 
those and, if not resolving them, then going to the WTO. But just 
you know, I apologize -- it's a technical area and it's important to 
distinguish those two different things. 
Now, as for a couple of the facts that you talked about, you 
know, obviously, in terms of the 201, this is for the ITC to 
determine. It did turn out that in the year 2000, U.S. imports were 
the second highest in U.S. history, both as a percentage of 
consumption and also in absolute terms. As a percentage of 
consumption, about 27 percent. In absolute terms, about 34.4 million 
metric tons. 
The OECD and other groups have done studies that underscore this 
basic point I made about the widening gap between productive capacity 
and demand and what has gone on in the United States has been a 
combination of things you talked about. On the one hand, U.S. capacity 
has fallen about 17.5 percent since 1980, and the United States steel 
industry has lost about 300,000 jobs. On the other hand, there have 
been investments in more productive capacity using new technologies. 
And in terms of technological productive methods, many of the U.S. 
companies are the top-of-the-line globally. And over this 20-year 
period, U.S. productivity has been raised over 300 percent. 
Now, one of the reasons the Europeans are anxious about this is 
that they know the same thing that I've just described about the rest 
of the world. In other words, if there is a safeguard action, the 
finding is made, the United States does determine that it needs to 
take some breathing space action in terms of safeguards, then, 
frankly, the Europeans, who don't at this point import as much steel 
as the United States does, is worried that some of these other 
countries that produce the steel under the same provisions I've 
outlined will come to Europe. And, frankly, that's one of the reasons 
why we've urged many parties to try to come together, because we have 
said that if the 201 findings are made, we believe an important part 
of this has to be an ongoing restructuring of the U.S. industry. 
And there's a recognition of this by U.S. steel companies, because, 
frankly, the more efficient ones also suffer from the fact that if 
capacity continues to be producing and putting them in a difficult 
position. 
The last piece of this puzzle -- and this is, again, one of the 
effects of the end of the Cold War -- is you have countries like 
Russia and Ukraine who also have steel productive capacity that's 
obviously built under a whole totally different system of command 
economy, and so how does that factor into the process. 
So I apologize for the length of it, but you asked a number of 
questions there, and I think -- I've had a number of conversations 
with Commissioner Lamy about this; it's a sensitive issue in Europe, 
no doubt about it. But I think the U.S. process here, using 201 is WTO 
consistent. We believe it's important for the industry for its long-
term, and frankly, we think it would be appropriate to try to have 
international discussions on capacity and some of these longer-term 
problems, and we'll just see how that goes. 
Q Can you say, though, whether the United States government 
would be willing to put some money into the restructure process? 
MR. ZOELLICK: Well, on that, it's really premature in terms of 
you have to go through a 201 and, as you may know, what happens with a 
201 is you have these findings, and then there's a recommendation by 
the ITC about what set of actions may be taken. And then the President 
has the right or has the option to determine sort of what action is 
taken. 
I will say this, is that it's the proclivity of this government 
not to be investing in U.S. industries but, instead, to create the 
environment in which they can restructure themselves and return to 
competitiveness as we just did, for example, with another industry 
dealing with wheat gluten. 
Q On the same subject, I mean, the subject is sensitive in 
Europe because there is the perception that there is a double 
standard. On the one hand, the free market, on the other hand, Section 
201 is really a protectionist measure. And there are some other issues 
that are coming up. On pasta, for example, they're -- at about 75 
percent. And I think in about 20 days your administration will have to 
decide whether to renew some other decision that had been made a few 
years ago about imports of pasta. Then we have the Helms-Burton Act 
that will expire soon, which applies extra territoriality, which has 
been the subject of dispute with Europe. 
So you're coming with some luggage here which doesn't send quite 
the right message in Europe, and that's why there is -- you know, some 
people are sensitive. What can you tell us about this? 
MR. ZOELLICK: I can say that it will be an inevitable fact of 
life that we will have these trade conflicts. We have one dealing, for 
example, with beef hormones, where the WTO decided in the United 
States favor again and again and again and Europe has not come into 
compliance with the WTO. 
We face a very frustrating problem with the European Commission's 
inability to have biotechnology approvals. That has stopped a great 
deal of our industry sales. And so that is why we have a WTO system. 
And that things that I mentioned, for example, in steel are WTO-
consistent. And I think, to the degree that we can, Commissioner Lamy 
and I are trying to work things within that system of rules. It has 
its flaws, but it also has its benefits, in terms of trying to manage 
potential trade conflicts. 
And, frankly, we're trying to keep our eye on the larger issues, 
as well, which is why we need to manage these and try to resolve 
these. And each of us have political environments in which we must 
operate. If you look at the overall economic gains to our countries, 
as well as the system of the Uruguay Round, they're enormous. And it 
is also important to keep the liberalization process moving forward. 
And that's one reason why, when we get on the phone -- which we 
regularly do -- we talk about the common things we're working 
together, we talk about ones we're trying to resolve, and we make good 
faith efforts to do so. 
And at least in a relatively short time, I mean, it wasn't a 
small thing to resolve a nine-year-old problem with bananas that 
people thought we couldn't get done. So we'll work on it -- we'll be 
successful with some, not with others. And all I can tell you is, when 
I talk to U.S. audiences, they think there is a fair amount of 
protection in Europe. I also understand the complaints about Europe 
with the United States. And that's one of the reasons they appointed 
me for this job, I guess. 
Q Are you going to review the Helms-Burton and the tariffs on 
pasta in the next 20 days? 
MR. ZOELLICK: The Helms-Burton is a congressional decision. And 
that's something that is going forward with the administration, as 
part of that process. I can't preview exactly what's going to happen 
on that. And on the pasta one, frankly, I apologize, I'm not a hundred 
percent familiar. I apologize. 
Q I want to ask you about the disputes procedure that you 
mentioned. How soon do you think such a disputes procedure could be 
put in place, and do you have any disputes, particularly, that you 
could put in there? 
MR. ZOELLICK: It's really just an effort on the part of the 
United States and EU, in a sense -- picking up on your question, sir 
is that to recognize that maybe there are ways that we can draw 
from experiences in other contexts. For example, now in U.S. court 
system we are normally required to go through a mediation process 
before you move to litigation. And to see whether that might work in 
some cases. 
So it's really early in our discussion. We're trying to see how 
one would try to structure it. It's probably more likely to work in an 
environment where it's a fundamental commercial problem, as opposed to 
a legislative problem. Sometimes, mediation processes in the private 
sector can identify solutions that it's hard for the parties to 
identify. 
On the other hand, obviously, I think people like myself believe 
we're trying in our good faith to identify those on our own, but I've 
certainly got no objection to try to get some suggestions and help on 
these. And some of these are small in terms of economic effect, but 
they add to the political dimension. And I think the key point for me, 
having done this for 20 years in both the public and private sector 
is, you have on the one hand, an incredibly integrated economic 
market, Trans-Atlantic, that I've just seen, frankly, explode in 
terms of its possibilities. 
And so, one shouldn't lose sight of that, which I saw in the 
private business sector, but you need ways to manage disputes, just as 
you have internal to the EU. And so that's what we're trying to 
explore and we'll take it step by step. 
Q Is the President or any other administration official 
pushing in their meeting for approval of the GE-Honeywell merger, and 
if the EU doesn't approve this deal, will it be detrimental to U.S.-EU 
relations and cooperation? 
MR. ZOELLICK: Well, as you know, that discussion is at a 
sensitive point now, and GE is in the process of discussing this with 
Commissioner Monte. Obviously, it's an important deal. I think that 
I've been sort of briefed on the case, I've discussed it with my 
European colleagues. I know that there is an effort on their part to 
try to work closely through their antitrust and competition law 
process, and I think that's the best channel for all parties to be 
working. But obviously, the United States has a strong interest in 
fair treatment. 
But I will also say this on this, is that the U.S. and European 
antitrust authorities have worked very well on a lot of different 
items. And it's an example, frankly, of a partnership that's been 
pretty effective. There, no doubt, will be differences, just as 
there's differences in various theories within the United States, but 
I hope that they can be worked out effectively together. 
Q Can I just follow on that? 
MR. ZOELLICK: You can try. (Laughter.) 
Q When you said you've discussed this with your European 
colleagues, what position have you taken? 
MR. ZOELLICK: Oh, I think that's a private discussion that I'd 
like to keep as it is. 
Thank you. 
#### 
END 
